Abstract
General Remarks
A statement on the International Criminal Court (ICC), whether by a prosecutor, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, or NGO, would be remiss without the ubiquitous invocation of doing justice for victims. Scenes of atrocities against civilian populations in Syria or Central African Republic leaves us, at least morally, believing that those responsible should be held to account. The Preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC captures this moral indignation by acknowledging that victims of such atrocities 'deeply shock the conscience of humanity' and that such crimes should not go unpunished. Yet we take for granted what justice for victims actually pertains to when we call for it, in the sense of how it is legally constructed. This raises some critical questions as to what justice means to victims; who are the victims; and how can one court deliver justice to thousands or potentially millions of victims of international crimes when it has to protect other parties before it? The Rome Statute and its interpretation by the ICC provides a particular vision of what justice for victims is; this article hopes to broaden this conception by moving beyond the rhetoric and envisaging how it can be made into a reality. While examining the current work of the ICC in delivering justice to victims before it, this article also hopes to locate the debate amongst the role of state parties to complement the work of the Court through domestic redress.
Historically the vision of justice for victims in international criminal tribunals has been assumed to coincide with the prosecution and punishment of those most responsible. At the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, the French Prosecutor Auguste Champetier De Ribes in his closing statement beseeched the judges to convict the defendants and 'to heed the voice of innocent blood crying for justice ' . 1 This invocation of victims to equate justice for them with retribution, serves an expressive purpose in affirming the moral legitimacy of international criminal justice in using punishment to enforce international law. 2 This was followed in subsequent tribunals. As noted by Antonio Cassese as President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in his first report to the UN Security Council and General Assembly, … from the victim's point of view, what matters is that there should be public disclosure of the inhuman acts from which he or she has suffered and that the actual perpetrator of the crime be tried and, if found guilty, punished. ... [T] he punishment of the authors of those barbarous acts by an impartial tribunal can be a means, at least in part, of alleviating their suffering and anguish. 3 Since then, victims have been disappointed by their lack of input or tangible benefits from the ICTY and the ICTR. 4 Jorda and de Hemptinne sum up that victims in the ad hoc tribunals were treated as objects of moral concern, rather than subjects with any rights to present their own interests. 5 On the legacy of the ICTY, President Meron recognized that,
The failure to properly address this issue [of reparations] constitutes a serious failing in the administration of justice to the victims of the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal cannot, through the rendering of its judgements alone, bring peace and reconciliation to the region: other remedies should complement the criminal trials if lasting peace is to be achieved, and one such remedy should be adequate reparations to the victims for their suffering. 6 Thus given the mandate of the ad hoc tribunals to prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes, other processes outside of criminal proceedings are needed to provide a more comprehensive account of justice for victims. The ad hoc tribunals did not deny the customary nature of victims' right to reparations, particularly in light of the Rome Statute, finding that measures are necessary to provide redress directly to victims. That said the judges of the ICTY and ICTR deemed that given the multitude of victims and its impact on criminal proceedings, reparations and victim participation would be very difficult to implement and run the risk of being 'counter to its principal objective of prosecuting those responsible for the crimes'. 7 By broadening international criminal justice to be more responsive to victims it brings challenges of its own in reconciling the need to deliver justice to potential thousands of individuals, against the logistical and financial limits of a single international institution.
The inclusion of reparations, victim participation and a Trust Fund within the ICC are seen as a way to overcome the shortcomings of previous tribunals by delivering a more inclusive vision of justice for victims. This article explores the meaning of justice for victims and how it fits into the ICC as its 'raison d'être'. 8 Instead of conceptualising justice for victims within retributive, restorative, or even transformational justice, this article situates justice within more procedural and corrective notions. 9 We begin by discussing the needs of victims of international crimes and what justice means for them. We then move onto to examine how justice for victims can be constructed in international criminal justice, drawing on discussions in victimology, restorative justice and human rights literature. This examination supports that justice for victims has both procedural and substantive dimensions, which are used in the second section to evaluate the practice of the Court itself as the internal component, in contrast to expanding the debate to examine the external development of justice for victims through state parties.
The emphasis of this article is to convey that the ICC can only provide justice to very select groups of victims, given its resource and jurisdictional limits. For justice for victims to be realized within the Rome Statute system, it requires action by state parties, both in terms of domestic efforts to tackle impunity and diplomatic pressure to encourage mutual cooperation. This recasting of justice for victims as primarily a state party concern is discussed through the notion of victim-orientated complementarity explored in the final section. As such, this article suggests that attention of the ICC should be concentrated on maximising justice to those victims before it, rather than trying to meet expectations to do justice for all victims in a situation. State parties thus carry the burden of meeting their obligations to investigate, prosecute and remedy international crimes.
Conceptualizing Justice for Victims of International Crimes
The gradual change to recognising the subjectivity of victims in international criminal justice came from developments in domestic criminal justice systems, with greater understanding of victims from the fields of victimology and human rights. Improving the position of victims has long been a domestic criminal justice issue, given victims' dissatisfaction with their treatment within the adversarial criminal justice system. 10 Christie famously noted that criminal justice was historically a conflict between the perpetrator and the victim, which had been 'stolen' by the state to end blood feuds and to provide more objective justice. 
B. Justice for Victims
Justice for victims before the ICC has often been portrayed as a 'fiction', 'illusory and elusive', owing to the rhetoric around the phrase and the disconnection felt by victims with the work of international criminal tribunals and courts. 21 The purpose of this section is flesh out a more meaningful way of conceptualising justice for victims to evaluate the work of the ICC and contribute to its future direction, drawing from victimology and human rights. In this author's view, justice for victims is 'the ability of victims to satisfy their procedural needs to inform outcomes that can fulfil their interests.' 22 Justice for victims can be seen as antithetical to impunity, which serves to deny victims' suffering and prevent their access to redress. 23 The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has found that impunity is the 'total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and conviction of those responsible'. 24 Such impunity 'fosters chronic recidivism' and leaves victims 'defenceless'. 25 Instead justice affirms victims' dignity, by acknowledging and remedying their harm. Accordingly facilitating justice for victims is vital in tackling impunity.
Justice for victims also engages with a rights-discourse, as it protects victims' agency through legal entitlement. A rights-discourse encourages the use of a common language to balance 20 Hoyle and Ullrich supra note 9. 21 The ICC is supposed to prosecute those perpetrators most responsible where a state is unwilling or unable to do so, making it a court of last resort. 45 However, the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators is dependent on prosecutorial selection, sufficient evidence and states transferring suspects to the Court. A more critical victimological reading of victim recognition would see such prioritisation of victims as creating a hierarchy with those most responsible before the ICC and the rest dependent on state action, with no enforcement or mechanism of redress to close the impunity gap between the two. While Aptel understandably calls for the ICC to prosecute more perpetrators and crimes to close this gap, really we need to be cultivating state responsibility to genuinely address such crimes. Victim applications have been reduced from 17 pages to 7, to one-page in the Ntaganda case to minimize cost and make the system more efficient. 48 Victim representation has been organised into groups with common interests, 49 or according to geographical location. 50 The Court has been sensitive to victims' diverse interests, such as in There is a need to harmonize victim participation at the ICC to save time and cost in litigation. This echoes concerns by state parties who wish to see a more coherent victim participation regime emerge, but judges have defended such moves to protect their discretion in responding to the circumstances in each case. 60 Perhaps as a compromise judges should have some flexibility to determine exceptional rights for victims, such as anonymous participation, but that modalities of presenting evidence, etc., remain the same in each case.
The annex of the revised ICC Victim Strategy to some extent outlines the 'rights or possibilities' of victim participation, a welcomed step towards making participation more harmonised. 61 Nonetheless, while participation can be made more effective, the impact of such participation through victims' input into decision-making in determining appropriate outcomes is insignificant. explain that such remedies are contingent on the defendant being convicted. 75 The TFV has suggested that reparations at the ICC can be a form of transformative justice through empowering victims and an opportunity to overcome inequality and exclusion, in particular for sexual violence. 76 However, such goals are beyond capacity and mandate of the ICC. 73 Though the VLR did cite concerns that some victims may have been intimidated, which could be discouraging them from participating. 82 In light of this, the Rome Statute at its outset implicitly accepts that the object and purpose of the ICC is, and state parties are also obliged, to end impunity through the investigation and prosecution of international crimes so as to deliver justice to victims. 83 As such, victim-orientated complementarity has a negative and positive side to its implementation.
Negative Victim-Orientated Complementarity
The negative aspect would allow the Court to take into account whether states are willing and able to protect victims' rights in determining admissibility of a situation and case. 84 The
Court has itself rhetorically stated that a state's inactivity would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Rome Statute 'to put an end to impunity' by allowing it to 'persist unchecked and thousands of victims would be denied justice'. 85 More substantive victim-orientated arguments have been raised in admissibility proceedings, but have not been taken into account by the Court in its decision, as they either were prospective proposals or did not add much to what the Prosecutor had already presented. In the Uganda situation victim submissions mostly discussed proposed provisions in the Juba Peace Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. They also highlighted the lack of access to justice for victims, non-existent witness protection and the Ugandan government's lack of sincerity in remedying victims' suffering. 86 The Court dismissed all their submissions as inappropriate as it entailed assessing future provisions. However, the Chamber should have considered the procedural problems victims face in accessing justice in Ugandan criminal proceedings and difficulties in seeking substantive redress for such crimes. 87 In the Libyan admissibility challenge, the OPCV voiced victims' concerns that they do not have access to criminal proceedings, including participation, protection and reparations, nor do they trust the Libyan government to provide impartial proceedings. 88 The Libyan government dismissed such claims, but explained that domestic proceedings would provide an important 'expressive value' in seeing justice done locally facilitating victim 'access' and 'ownership'. 89 Yet this misses the point that victim participation is not about promoting local ownership, but ensuring their interests are considered in determining effective justice outcomes in tackling impunity.
The Court has established clear admissibility standards in determining whether a case is admissible under Article 17, in particular whether conduct under question is being investigated and prosecuted by domestic authorities and whether such proceedings are genuine. 90 In relation to conduct over legal characterisation, there is an argument for considering that domestication of international crimes better characterise the seriousness of victims' suffering. For instance in Uganda Thomas Kwoyelo, a former LRA commander, was charged with kidnap with intent to murder for using child soldiers, instead of the more appropriate international crime of enlisting or conscripting children and civilians to participate in hostilities. 91 States should be encouraged to incorporate the Rome Statute into their domestic law to better capture the gravity of crimes committed against victims.
However, this may be more appropriate for the Assembly of State Parties to foster than the Court.
In terms of genuine proceedings the ICC is not a human rights court to examine a state's compliance with human rights fair trial standards. 92 It is apparent that domestic criminal trials of international crimes need witness protection programmes to facilitate the prosecution of perpetrators as primary sources of evidence and can be an assessment of ability. 93 However, such considerations are just a factor in the assessment of a state's ability to conducted genuine proceedings. Other victim provisions, such as participation, are also important in improving victim satisfaction, perceptions of legitimacy of criminal proceedings and the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms in tackling impunity.
In determining whether a state is unwilling to investigate a case the Court can 118 See Torture in Uganda, Redress (2007) . Torture is prohibited under Article 24 of the Ugandan Constitution, but this can only give rise to a claim before the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, rather than a criminal prosecution. 119 In that the principle of non-retroactivity is inapplicable for crimes recognized by the international community at the time it was committed.
In terms of procedural rules, a victim-orientated approach to complementarity would require states to provide for victim participation, protection, and access to information and to claim reparations. In addition, states should develop prosecutorial and remedial policies for vulnerable victims, such as children and those subjected to sexual and gender-based violence.
Such A more difficult task is incorporating victim participation into domestic proceedings.
Victims should have access to all judicial proceedings and mechanisms that affect their 120 The 'court concerned shall, where appropriate, take the measures specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 and 5 of that brought the trial to a halt, with little pressure from state parties or the ASP to ensure Kenya's cooperation or to develop domestic accountability mechanisms. 133 The ASP currently has a procedure for non-cooperation; however, it is a soft touch, entailing public statements with political and diplomatic engagement. 134 A more vigorous approach would be for the ASP to create subsidiary bodies to provide independent oversight to monitor and evaluate the work of the Court, under its mandate to consider non-cooperation. 135 suffering and corrodes the legitimacy of international institutions' ability to do justice for such atrocities. The best antidote to such situations is for states to fulfil their responsibility under international law to investigate, prosecute and remedy such crimes. A victim-orientated agenda is imperative in the Rome Statute's purpose of tackling impunity for international crimes.
Conclusion
The ICC is a retributive institution concerned with prosecuting and punishing those most responsible for international crimes. At its minimum holding those individuals most responsible for international crimes can offer some form of justice to victims. As Antonio punishment of perpetrators, which can alleviate their suffering and anguish. 152 The ICC has expanded this understanding of justice to include victim participation, protection measures, assistance and reparations. A fuller account of justice for victims proposed in this article draws from the experience of human rights and victimology to provide a picture of how justice can be responsive to victims' needs and interests, and balanced with other interests by justice mechanisms.
The Court and state parties can do more to achieve more meaningful justice for victims. Within the Court victim participation needs to be harmonised, where there is conflict with the rights of the defendant, the prosecution and victims, the judges as professional objective arbiters can balance competing interests in determining justice. In addition, the ICC should ensure that victim participation is more meaningful by more carefully considering their interests as consultees in the decision making process in determining appropriate outcomes. It does not mean victims are sovereign or their rights absolute, but their interests should be given sufficient weight in decisions that affect them. In substantive terms, the ICC should concentrate on doing justice to those victims before it, rather than being concerned with those outside of the Court.
In terms of victim-orientated complementarity it remains a colossal task, and one that will take years to develop. There is incipient state practice to this effect, albeit in a haphazard fashion with Western governments funding the Ugandan International Crimes Division, and NGOs, such as Avocats Sans Frontier and the International Bar Association, supporting the mobile courts in the DRC. International Crimes Divisions are however window-dressing, the appearance of formal justice, but lack the political will or resources to tackle impunity. By not regulating and monitoring compliance with the Rome Statute system the alternative is that states will collude to define justice for victims on their own terms. Victim-orientated complementarity is about removing the burden from victims of seeking justice, without silencing them, by facilitating their access and participation in accountability mechanisms.
Importantly victim-orientated complementarity is imperative in tackling the façade of complementarity, by ensuring state parties are effectively tackling impunity domestically.
By itself the Court cannot prosecute every perpetrator of international crimes, nor deliver justice to every victim. As Cassese famously stated, international criminal justice is 'a giant without arms and legs' dependent on states to fulfil its functions. 153 So too is the ICC when it comes to achieving justice for victims, it is reliant on state parties to complement its work and deliver justice locally. There is also a need to manage expectations as to what the ICC can and cannot do, making the explicit link to the responsibility of states to develop their own justice mechanisms to offer effective remedies to victims of international crimes. The ASP and regional organisations may be able to play an important oversight and enforcement role to encourage state parties' development of victim-orientated justice mechanisms.
Perhaps it may require not invoking justice for victims and the ICC as the battle cry against impunity, without qualifying the Court's application to certain victims and the role of states to complement it through delivering justice locally. That said the value of the ICC is that justice for victims is its 'raison d'être', and can help to foster a victim-orientated agenda in domestic processes. Justice for victims of international crimes is a worthy goal, but we need to concentrate the discussion on how we can make it meaningful in reality in the Hague and on the ground.
